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This paper explores the misinformation phenomena surrounding COVID-19 on social 
media platforms and its potential impact on the trajectory of the COVID-19 pandemic in 
the US. It defines the terms misinformation and disinformation and links these to recent 
political phenomena of “fake news” and political disinformation campaigns. It 
characterizes the sources of misinformation online and seeks to analyze the psycho-
social and cognitive mechanisms of online misinformation spread such as source and 
message credibility through research on vaccine hesitancy and misinformation online 
during other global pandemics and resurging epidemics. Network analysis establishes 
that misinformation online spreads farther and faster than factual information on social 
media platforms. Relationships between misinformation and impact on health are 
explored utilizing research based in agent-based modeling techniques.  It argues for the 
quantification and characterization of COVID-19 online misinformation in order to 
develop targeted interventions to vulnerable and at-risk groups using informed risk 
communication practices across all levels of government to mitigate disparities in 
COVID-19 case rates and transmission. 
       Keywords: SARS-CoV-19; COVID-19; Misinformation; Disinformation; Credibility; 







On February 15, 2020, at the Munich Security Conference, Dr. Tedros 
Ghebreyesus, the WHO Director-General, outlined the threat of misinformation and 
called on the international community to counter the spread of misinformation, “We’re 
not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic.” An infodemic is an 
overabundance of information that occurs during an epidemic and includes both 
accurate and inaccurate information (Tangcharoensathien et al, 2020). The deluge of 
information and misinformation during outbreaks is expected, but the difference now 
with social media is the amplification of this phenomenon which includes new 
challenges from sources of disinformation like trolls and bots. Public Health efforts to 
contain a pandemic depend on individuals understanding the associated risks in order 
to make informed decisions (Holroyd et al, 2020). The amount and characteristics of 
information available to the public about COVID-19, both reliable and unreliable, is 
constantly changing and evolving. Health-related misinformation has been associated 
with severe consequences with regards to people’s quality of life and risk of mortality 
(Vosoughi et al, 2018). Misinformation and disinformation spread over social media and 
can be a potential barrier to effective disease outbreak response (Broniatowski et al, 
2018). Like viruses themselves, misinformation fills the void of knowledge in new 
disease outbreaks and can overtake slow process of science and building evidence. 
During an outbreak, time is of the essence not only to ensure people informed with 
appropriate information, but to ensure that people are informed with correct information 
in order to act appropriately and mitigate the spread of disease. In today’s media 
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environment, viral social media posts are also frequently reported on in the news media 
giving misinformation another potential route for dissemination.  
Background 
The WHO declared COVID-19 a global pandemic on March 11, 2020 and the US 
quickly followed suit declaring the virus a national emergency on March 13, 2020. 
Misinformation about the pandemic quickly spread online and was more popular than 
accurate information (Cuan-Baltazar et al, 2020). In a viral video retweeted, then 
deleted, by President Trump and his son Donald Trump Jr., a group of doctors led by 
Dr. Stella Immanuel held a press conference where they made the unsubstantiated 
claim that hydroxychloroquine is a “cure for COVID-19” despite multiple studies that 
have disputed claims that antimalarial and antiviral drugs such as hydroxychloroquine 
can help treat or even prevent the virus. According to the New York Times, this one 
example of misinformation was the #2 most-engaged post on Facebook on July 27, 
2020 garnering 14 million views in 6 hours. A successful public health response to 
outbreaks depends on broad dissemination and wide-spread acceptance of accurate 
information (Parmet et al, 2020). 
Inaccurate and deceptive information, or misinformation, erode trust in 
institutions and public health experts (Vosoughi et al, 2018). Traditional public health 
communication strategies and outbreak response are challenged by diffusion of 
conspiracy-like health-related information. The persuasive effect of misinformation on 
social media could have harmful consequences for the public if individuals disregard the 
social-distancing and protective health behaviors recommended by public health 
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authorities. In addition to individual-level health risks, non-compliance with public health 
recommendations creates negative consequences through the transmission of disease 
to others in the community. Individuals seek information in times of crisis, but with new 
evidence emerging almost daily the public needs information to inform their actions in 
order to prevent and reduce their risk for contracting and transmitting disease. Science 
reduces uncertainty, but slowly, and the information environment evolves rapidly. This 
paper seeks to explore the role misinformation has played in the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the characteristics of misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic, how individuals 
interact with misinformation related to COVID-19, and the potential impact of 
misinformation on health behavior and outcomes. 
Defining Misinformation and Disinformation 
Misinformation has been defined as information that is contrary to the epistemic 
consensus of the scientific community regarding a phenomenon (Swire-Thompson et al, 
2019). However, in general, science is continuously evolving and what is considered 
true and false is constantly changing as new evidence and methods are advanced, but 
this is especially true during new infectious disease outbreaks. Surveillance systems 
can identify early cases of novel disease outbreaks, but researchers need time to 
establish a case definition and establish risk profiles. Retrospective observational 
studies must be conducted in order to better understand the outbreak and studies can 
sometimes reach opposing conclusions or none at all. In this information vacuum, 
information that is inadvertently false and is shared with or without intent to cause harm 
tends to fill the vacuum and is called misinformation. Similar terms like “fake news” 
overlap with misinformation and have recently been popularized in the US and across 
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the globe as a result of the 2016 presidential election cycle. However, terms like “fake 
news” are harder to define and lack an agreed upon definition. Types of misinformation 
differ depending on intent and mode of spread. Disinformation is a coordinated or 
deliberate effort to knowingly circulate misinformation in order to cause harm, gain 
money, power, or reputation. It is, however, difficult to ascertain intent. For example, 
anti-vaccine propaganda may be spread both by those who have a genuine concern 
about vaccine safety and by those who are using disinformation as a tool to undermine 
trust in institutions or governments. Both the CDC and the World Health Organization 
now recommend cloth masks for the general public, but earlier in the pandemic, both 
organizations recommended just the opposite partly based on what was thought to be 
low disease prevalence earlier in the pandemic. However, news and social media were 
rife with stories purporting that the use of face masks were not effective against the 
transmission of COVID-19 despite clear evidence that masks can help prevent the 
spread of COVID-19 (Howard et al, 2020). Unless the intent is clear, the term 
misinformation is used in this paper as the umbrella term that includes all forms of false 
and misleading information.   
Misinformation online 
Misinformation is found in various types of media, including news media like Fox 
News, CNN, and online on social media platforms. Individuals learn about various 
illnesses, risks, and protective behaviors from a variety of sources, however, according 
to a Pew Research Report, 90% of all US adults used the internet in 2019 and 80% of 
internet users have looked online for information about any of 15 health topics such as a 
specific disease or treatment (Pew Report, 2020). 
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The pathways of misinformation online include direct to online sources such as 
the CDC or the New York Times where search engines are bypassed and online visitors 
go straight to the online domains to read information. Search-based engines are also a 
popular pathway, wherein approximately 5% of all internet searches were health-related 
in 2015 (Swire-Thompson et al, 2019). Individuals can find information online to support 
many different hypotheses. One study investigated online information seeking by asking 
laypeople in a hypothetical scenario involving a relative who was experiencing a 
particular set of symptoms and asked participants to hypothesize a diagnosis based on 
their searches. The researchers found that initially incorrect prior knowledge often led 
individuals to search of information on irrelevant websites and to seek out data that 
would confirm their initial incorrect hypotheses implying confirmation bias (Keselman, 
2008). 
    An important and popular pathway of misinformation online include 
platforms with user-generated content that provide for an ecosystem with coproduction 
of content and consumption by users. A significant challenge with analyzing social 
media is the challenge to assessing source credibility seeing as how users are 
generating content and are not subject to forms of factual verification or accountability 
(Metzger, 2003). Some platforms are content-rating sites like Yelp, others provide for 
editing content like Wikipedia, and include social media platforms. Some platforms allow 
wide access to editing yet require users to follow a strict set of norms about what 
constitutes information worthy of inclusion like Wikipedia. Others, such as Twitter and 
WhatsApp, have less norms or rules about what information can be included or shared 
and are thus more permeable to misinformation. Facebook is the most popular of these 
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platforms with 2 billion users, followed closely by YouTube and WhatsApp. The social 
media landscape is also constantly evolving as seen by the advent and rise in popularity 
of TikTok.  Table 1 outlines the different types of popular online platforms and their key 
features.  
Table 1. Online Platforms and Key Features 
Online Platform Key Characteristics 
Yelp ·    Content-rating site 
·    User generated content – coproduction and consumption 
Wikipedia ·    Online free encyclopedia with user-generated content 
·    Requires users to follow a strict set of norms for including 
information like citing sources 
Twitter ·    User generated content – coproduction and consumption 
·    Little rules or norms for content 
·    Piloting new fact-checking mechanisms that flags tweets 
with contested or false information 
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WhatsApp ·    Communications platform popular internationally 
·    Content sharing enabled 
·    Cited in international news media as rampant with 
misinformation 
Facebook ·    Most popular global social media platform 
·    Little rules or norms for user-generated content 
·    Company executives have resisted calls to tighten rules 
and norms against misinformation 
Instagram and 
TikTok 
·    Mostly visual user-generated content 
·    User-generated memes and videos frequently include 
content about the COVID-19 pandemic 
·    Newer platforms popular with younger people 
Misinformation on these platforms is widespread and contain narratives that are 
often dominated by personal, negative, and opinionated tones, which often induce fear, 
anxiety and mistrust in institutions. A study analyzed 800 vaccine-related Pinterest 
posts and found that 74% were anti-vaccine sentiment (Guidry et al, 2015). An early 
quantification of the misinformation and unverifiable content about the COVID-19 
pandemic on Twitter analyzed about 673 tweets related to COVID-19, with around 
24.8% of the tweets included misinformation (Kouzy et al, 2020). Figure 1 below 
includes examples of Tweets containing misinformation. Another study critically 
analyzed search results based on the search terms “Wuhan Coronavirus” during the 
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early stages of the pandemic in 2020 and used multiple information quality measures of 
health information. Critical analysis performed on the search terms included within the 
study used the Health on the Net Foundation Code of Conduct, the Journal of the 
American Medical Association benchmark, the DISCERN instrument, and the Google 
ranking as validation instruments for high quality health information online. It found that 
by February 6, 2020 no quality information in the search results was available on the 
internet about COVID-19 (Cuan-Baltazar et al, 2020). Online platforms and companies 
are uniquely positioned to address misinformation because they control the data on 
their platforms, but they do not allow researchers access to the data and block 
government efforts to regulate their industry while piloting in-house solutions to control 
the spread of misinformation. 





The spread of misinformation 
Misinformation spread at the individual level involves three components in its 
creation, production, distribution, and re-production - the agent, the message, and its 
interpretation. Many entities spread misinformation and disinformation online including, 
but not limited to, individuals, politicians, vested interests, news media, corporations and 
multinationals with economic interests attempting to shape the public debate, “bots” – 
accounts that automate content promotions, and “trolls” – individuals who misrepresent 
their identities with the intention of promoting discord (Broniatowski et al, 2018). When 
message agents are determined to be credible messengers, misinformation can have a 
lasting impact. This is the case in the traditional public health example of misinformation 
in the publication of fraudulent research linking the MMR vaccine to autism and bowel 
disease. While the study has been long discredited, the concerns raised by the study 
have been widely disseminated on social media and are highly influential among some 
groups (Taylor et al, 1999). New research suggests that the type of actor in the 
production and reproduction of misinformation online have significant impacts on online 
communication about vaccination. Where “content polluters” posted more anti-vaccine 
content, Russian trolls amplified both sides of the debate and sought to promote discord 
(Broniatowski et al, 2018). 
At the system level, patterns of misinformation and its characteristics, particularly 
online, can be discerned and information cascades can be observed. Early literature on 
misinformation established the basic law of rumor in that the amount of rumor in 
circulation will vary with the importance of the subject to the individuals concerned times 
the ambiguity of the evidence pertaining to the topic (Allport et al, 1947). Rumor theory 
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is relevant to the online information ecosystem. In a study of news stories distributed on 
Twitter from 2006 to 2017, falsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and 
more broadly than the truth in all categories of information. The truth rarely diffused to 
more than 1,000 people whereas the top 1% of false news cascades routinely diffused 
to between 1,000 and 100,000 people. It took the truth about six times as long as 
falsehood to reach 1,500 people and 20 times as long as falsehood to reach a cascade 
depth of 10. The greater likelihood of people to retweet falsity more than the truth is 
what drove the spread of false news in this study despite network and individual factors 
that favor the truth. Misinformation about the Zika virus diffused farther, faster, and 
deeper than true information about the virus and was associated to content messages 
that elicited more fear, disgust, and surprise (Vosoughi et al, 2018). 
At the individual level, judgements are formed about the believability of the 
message and is informed by the source of the information, narrative and context; the 
reproduction of that misinformation can depend on the degree to which receivers 
suspect the information is credible or misleading (Brainard et al, 2018). Psychological 
and cultural dimensions of misinformation related to COVID-19 can increase or 
decrease perceived credibility of message and source and need to be analyzed to 
understand its import to individuals within their social and cultural contexts. 
Credibility 
The credibility of information related to COVID-19 encompasses message 
credibility, source credibility, and media credibility. Source credibility and persuasive 
content are factors when assessing the susceptibility of users to the messages 
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conveyed, as are misperception and confirmation bias where people’s views on factual 
matters are strongly influenced by prior beliefs (Metzger et al, 2003). Some 
communities mistrust government  and health professionals based on a long history of 
unethical research on and treatment of Black Americans has led many to question the 
credibility of government and public health institutions. Immigrant communities may be 
distrustful of public health departments and other agents of the state, particularly among 
immigrants without legal permission to reside in the US and face higher health risks. 
The perceived credibility of the message and its source can heighten the persuasive 
impact of the message, particularly for messages that reflect and reinforce group 
commitments that individuals identify with socially, culturally, and politically. 
Interpretation and acceptance of misinformation can vary based on a person’s identity 
or personal beliefs and when framed in the form of “culturally antagonistic memes” that 
connect the message to divisive social and political issues, risk perception can be 
altered. An experiment found that exposing a large sample of ordinary members of the 
US general public to materials with culturally antagonistic memes excited opposing 
affective states among members of varied cultural groups. The memes linked Zika to 
global warming and unlawful immigration. Members of distinct cultural groups then 
displayed biased formation of beliefs about the dangers of the Zika virus (Kahan et al, 
2017). More research is needed to understand how source credibility, message 
credibility, and media credibility interact with the socio-cultural context of individuals and 




One study found that large-scale person-to-person diffusion of information is a 
fairly rare occurrence despite frequent reports in the news media. The study explored 
the structure of how content spread on Twitter and the likelihood it was to spread either 
by person-to-person diffusion (large-scale virality) or by being broadcast (where many 
people receive the information directly from the same source like social media 
influencers or news media). It found that the popularity of information was predicted 
primarily by the largest broadcast, and viral cascades were a relatively uncommon 
occurrence (Goel et al, 2016). The outcome of competition or whether misinformation 
gets shared or reproduced is often dependent on how much each message resonates 
with an individual’s values. Social media increases these effects, both as a source of 
misinformation and as a catalyst for dissemination as viral memes are regularly reported 
on in news media and reach a wide audience (Sell et al, 2020). 
Echo chambers on social media are often cited as having a polarizing effect on 
individuals as they have an information diet that reinforces their worldviews and where 
extremism is exacerbated. These chambers are environments in which a person 
encounters only beliefs or opinions that coincide with their own, so that existing views 
are reinforced and leading to more extremist views. A network analysis of the 
interconnectedness of anti-fluoride activists on Facebook who lobby against fluoride in 
drinking water found that the networks were highly interconnected and significantly 
moreso than the site overall (Seymore et al, 2015). Another study found that political 
fake news engagement was extremely concentrated on Twitter with approximately 1% 
of individuals that were exposed to 80% of the fake news sources, and just 0.1% of 
individuals shared 80% of the fake news sources. Apart from these “supersharers” of 
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misinformation, the individuals that were more likely to engage with fake news were 
conservative leaning, highly engaged with political news, and older adults (Grinberg et 
al, 2019). In fact, another study found that adults over the age of 65 were seven times 
more likely to share political fake news on Facebook than were those between 18 and 
20 (Guess et al, 2019). Certain demographic groups may not understand the source of 
user-generated content on social media, and can have the impact of making older 
adults and other vulnerable groups especially susceptible to misinformation online. 
Impact of misinformation on health 
The impact of misinformation can vary depending on its prevalence, content, and 
persuasive capacity (Sell et al, 2020). Evidence from previous disease outbreaks 
concludes that misinformation is a serious threat to public health efforts to control a 
pandemic (Kalichman et al, 2009). Adults who endorsed conspiracy beliefs during the 
2014 Ebola outbreak (e.g. a cure for Ebola exists but is being withheld) reported that 
they would be less likely to seek medical care if they thought they had Ebola. They also 
reported less support for quarantine policies than adults who did not endorse those 
beliefs (Earnshaw et al, 2019). In early 2019, the US experienced multiple declarations 
of public health emergencies due to measles outbreaks. In Europe, the WHO revoked 
the measles eradication status of four countries: Albania, Czechia, Greece, and the UK. 
Some reasons attributed to the revocation include global anti-vaxxer social movements, 
“too little, too late” responses from public health authorities, corrective information filled 
with high-quality scientific information but was filed with too much jargon, etc. (Poland et 
al, 2010). The anti-vaxxer movement is grounded in misinformation and conspiracy 
theories that are focused on rhetorical and personal arguments that induce negative 
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emotions like fear, anger, and sadness. More research is needed to quantify the impact 
on health and link the recent measles outbreaks to these movements. 
Misinformation from seemingly credible sources, like governments, can have an 
impact on health. An example of this is when US President Trump touted chloroquine or 
hydroxychloroquine as a treatment for COVID-19 via tweet on March 19, 2020. In the 
two weeks after this mention, searches for how to purchase this unverified treatment for 
COVID-19 surged by more than 200,000 searchers over the average level prior to the 
COVID-19 crisis (Liu et al, 2020). Even after the news media reported on the fatal 
poisoning of a Phoenix man, searches for purchasing the drugs remained elevated at 
200% and 1,167% higher than average for both drugs respectively (Liu et al, 2020). 
False remedies for illness, incorrect information on disease transmission, or allegations 
that disease is associated with a government conspiracy are all common examples of 
health misinformation during public health events or emergencies (Kouzy et al, 2020). In 
a working paper yet to be published by the University of Chicago, Bursztyn, et. al study 
the differential exposure to news media and how misinformation on two shows on the 
Fox News network affect behavior and downstream health outcomes (Bursztyn et al, 
2020). Their preliminary findings suggest that the documented effects on health 
outcomes are driven by the differences in messaging in how the two shows on the same 
network covered the pandemic in February and early March. The researchers suggest 
that when the virality of posts on social media are reported on in the news media this 
potentially has an amplification effect and impact on health behavior and outcomes. 
However, while misinformation has been prevalent in other pandemics, more research 
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is needed to understand the prevalence of COVID-19 misinformation and its potential 
impacts on behavior and health. 




Misinformation related to infectious disease and vaccines have been shown to be 
highly prevalent online and in social media. In previous epidemics, misinformation has 
been shown to rely on its persuasive impact to propel its spread - informed by the 
credibility of the source, the message, and narratives that confirm prior beliefs and 
values. Misinformation agents can be bots, trolls, or individual “supersharers” that deal 
in narratives inducing fear, anxiety, and mistrust in institutions. Social media virality has 
also been reported on widely in the news media with the capability to broadcast 
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messages with potential severe consequences for health. However, the mechanics of 
how misinformation impacts behavior is not widely understood and the interpretation 
and persuasive impact of misinformation messages depend largely on prior beliefs, 
values, and the social and cultural contexts of individuals. Figure 1 below outlines a 
proposed model for understanding the mechanics of how misinformation related to 
COVID-19 might have an impact on behavior and outcomes. 
Rather than engage in censorship to counter individual actors or bots and trolls, 
public health authorities should aim to build trust and credibility with vulnerable 
populations by leveraging the credibility of health care professionals to develop and 
deliver targeted risk-based communication interventions. The characterization of 
COVID-19 related misinformation is needed to develop evidence-based risk 
communication interventions during public health emergencies. Targeted interventions 
and risk-based messages must be a part of a resilient information system that supports 
an engaged and informed public and is designed to protect vulnerable and at-risk 
groups. 
Risk Communication 
       The World Health Organization (2020) defines risk communication as the 
exchange of real-time information, advice, and opinions between experts and people 
facing threats to their health, economic or social well-being. Two broad risk models are 
commonly employed – one takes a realist approach where risk is seen to be objective 
and independent of social context, and the second is the social constructionist approach 
where risk is seen to be interrelated with the socio-cultural context. The literature has 
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increasingly recognized that society, communities, and patients view risk from a social 
constructionist approach (Abrams et al, 2020). The effectiveness of evidence-based risk 
communication interventions may vary according to each individual’s personal beliefs, 
values, literacy, and socio-demographic characteristics. The effectiveness of risk 
communication during a pandemic is critical to ensure behavior change that reduces the 
risk of individual and community transmission. The WHO’s strategy to counter the 
infodemic risk was to create a new information platform called the WHO Information 
Network for Epidemics (EPI-WIN). EPI-WIN staff of communications officers and 
consultants work with different professionals who provide them with advice, guidelines, 
and accurate information about epidemics. Staff search social media platforms for 
questions or rumors that spread who then rely on professionals to develop information 
to counter rumors. A similar approach could be adopted in the US with a focus on 
vulnerable populations and understanding the sociocultural context of misinformation 
messages.  
       Heightened risk perception during pandemics can have a profound impact on the 
trajectory of the pandemic due to the manner in which people perceive and respond to 
risk. Pandemics, including COVID-19, exhibit dread factors like high rates of infection, 
significant morbidity and mortality, lack of protective or therapeutic measures and rapid 
increases in cases or case fatality rates. The World Health Organizations noted that 
shortages of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) at the early onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic were leaving doctors and nurses dangerously ill-equipped to care for patients 
due to the limited access of supplies and that these shortages were largely as a result 
of panic buying, hoarding, and misuse driven by consumer fear and demand. 
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Misinformation in this environment of heightened risk perception and evolving 
information can increase fear and perception of risk potentially leading to shortages of 
PPE worldwide. The primary goals of risk communication include both alerting people 
and reassuring people – both are two different activities but required in order to be 
effective. 
SARS-Cov-2 is highly contagious and lethal - the basic reproductive rate for the 
virus is estimated to be 2.5 compared to 0.9 for the MERS-CoV pandemic. As of August 
2020, the CDC has yet to confirm a mortality rate for COVID-19  but early estimates 
project the mortality rate that is closer to 1% which is 10 times more lethal than the 
seasonal flu. Age and comorbidities are both risk factors for severe illness with COVID-
19 infection. Latinos and Blacks are disproportionately contracting COVID-19 in the US 
and have disproportionately high case fatality rates when compared to whites (Adhikari 
et al, 2020; Wortham et al, 2020). Latinos and Blacks may also be more vulnerable to 
misinformation messages that employ narratives based on the historical abuses of 
government. More research is needed to understand the persuasive impact of these 
culturally antagonistic memes. As of August 2020, researchers and society continue to 
grapple with many unknowns and questions about the virus - its mutation rate, if a 
vaccine will be efficient, the case fatality rate, among other factors, not just its 
contagiousness and lethality. Uncertainty in illness has been associated with anxiety, 
depression and distress, and can result in panic and passivity (Abrams, 2020).  
A key goal of risk communication is how to make people feel safe with 
uncertainty. Accurate and well-developed health communication can facilitate how 
societies handle uncertainty and fear, promote and accomplish adherence to necessary 
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behavior change, and meet individuals’ fear and foster hope during times of crisis 
(Abrams, 2020). Risk communication must cause just enough anxiety for individuals to 
take advice from authorities yet optimistic enough to feel that their actions make a 
difference. 
       The overarching imperative in risk communication is to communicate with 
transparency – authorities should declare what is known and what is unknown. Only 
facts should be shared and communicators should acknowledge the “temporality of 
facts” as a work in progress. In an evolving information environment such as an 
outbreak of novel disease, recommendations may change based on previously 
unknown evidence. Both the CDC and the World Health Organization now recommend 
cloth masks for the general public, but earlier in the pandemic, both organizations 
recommended just the opposite based on a variety of factors and the trajectory of the 
outbreak. However, more clarity and transparency should have been employed because 
these shifting guidelines may have caused confusion among the general public about 
the efficacy of masks in protecting against transmission. 
The attitude and behavior of all leaders at all levels is important in order to flatter 
the curve. Flattening the cureve is a public health strategy to slow down the spread of 
the SARS-CoV-2 virus during the COVID-19 pandemic. The curve being flattened is the 
epidemic curve, a visual representation of the number of infected people requiring 
health care over time. In addition to shifting guidelines, the US President, Donald J. 
Trump, has mostly abdicated the responsibility for a coordinated national approach to 
each state. The only consistency in his communications is the inconsistency. NPR 
constructed a timeline of the trajectory of the pandemic, along with the president’s 
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tweets that highlights that misinformation can come directly from the federal government 
and add to the confusion and anxiety among the public. Figure 2 below is a sample of 
the tweets from the NPR website. Many of the tweets speculate or over-reassure which 
can lead to people feeling more alarmed. 





Along with Trump’s tweets, misinformation from other sources continue to 
circulate widely online and goes mostly unabated. A widely discredited video 
documentary called “Plandemic'' circulated online and promoted the idea that wearing a 
protective mask can make people sick and that the novel coronavirus most likely 
emerged from a laboratory. The impact of this viral video is unknown, but social media 
is awash in videos of largely irate individuals ejected from public spaces and stores due 
to their unwillingness to comply with mask orders. Some of the subjects in the video cite 
the same misinformation narratives that can be found on social media platforms.  
Information should not be withheld because of fears of creating “panic.” If officials 
withhold information and then are wrong, they will lose credibility and the trust of 
individuals. If officials are concerned, they should say so, and allow the public to feel 
concerned as well. Clear action steps should be provided like wash your hands 
regularly, cough in a tissue or elbow, practice social distancing, etc. Clear action steps 
that provide a sustainable approach by giving people options helps manage fear and 
works to counter quarantine fatigue or exhaustion associated with the new restrictive 
lifestyle that’s been adopted to slow the spread of COVID-19. Figure 3 below are 
examples of effective risk communication messages. Effective, transparent, and clear 
risk communication that acknowledges emotions of fear and anxiety yet is consistent 
and specific enough to create hope can be one of the most effective tools in controlling 
or mitigating the pandemic. 




Educating the general public via universal messages based on principles of risk 
communication is key to reducing the spread of disease, but it is not enough. Culturally 
antagonistic memes are rampant on social media and are based on historical misdeeds 
of the US government and public health researchers. The well-known Tuskegee study 
of untreated syphilis was a clinical study conducted between 1932 and 1972 by the 
United States Public Health Service who enrolled 600 impoverished Black men. 
Researchers knowingly failed to treat participants appropriately and even withheld the 
diagnosis. Today, culturally antagonistic memes about COVID-19 contain persuasive 
narratives that include: COVID-19 was created in a laboratory; that it has been deployed 
as a bio-weapon against populations for the purposes of constructing and disseminating 
the use of cellular 5G networks with the aim to increase population level control; that it 
is used as an excuse by the government to employ forced vaccination against Blacks 
and Latinos; andamong many other theories that include messages of discord and often 
use or rely on historical markers or precedents like the Tuskegee Experiment. 
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Subsequent media reported groups of people across the US that were attempting to 
bring down cellular towers. While racial and ethnic non-white groups are being 
disproportionately affected by COVID-19 largely due to inequities in the social 
determinants of health, such as poverty and healthcare access, the rampant 
misinformation targeted towards these groups should not go unaddressed. Targeted 
interventions based in prevention have the potential to lift all boats, but targeted 
interventions need to be informed by the characterization and trends of COVID-19 
related misinformation while simultaneously working to build media literacy that can 
teach the public how to protect themselves against misinformation. 
The framework above combines psychological approaches to theorize the 
individual level cognitive response when receiving misinformation messages and 
network science of online social media platforms. Both are necessary to understand the 
individual level impact as well as the social mechanisms and patterns of the spread and 
prevalence of misinformation and its potential impact on outcomes. Confirmation bias 
plays an important role in cognitive response as well as the creation of online echo 
chambers. More information is needed to characterize the socio-psychological 
characteristics of those who believe and propagate misinformation, including bots and 
trolls who have malintent and promote narratives of discord, fear, and anxiety. In order 
to better understand the mechanics, COVID-19 misinformation must be classified. 
   Public health risk and crisis communications needs to develop communication 
strategies that are informed by patterns of narratives of misinformation in order to be 
effective. Unchecked, the accumulation of misinformation and conspiracy theories can 
promote social movements that attack the credibility of institutions and public health 
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authorities. Credibility is key to enacting behavior change and protection from risks in a 
pandemic. Efforts to promote behavior change require effective risk communication at 
the individual level and action at the community level to change the environment in 
ways that facilitate new behaviors. Risk communications should attempt to elicit and 
address common doubts and concerns people have about recommended advice (Khatri 
et al, 2020). Government agencies should develop interventions and strategies that 
include increasing their online presence on popular social media platforms in order to 
combat misinformation about COVID-19. Ultimately, tackling the challenges of 
misinformation and disinformation will require a cross-sectoral approach that works 
within the confines of the democratic system and the principles of free speech to 
imagine new and creative ways to address the rapidly evolving threat of misinformation 
during pandemics. 
 Implications 
       The internet has increasingly become polluted by both misinformation and 
especially disinformation. False and misleading information online and in social media 
platforms can influence people’s opinions and behaviors with profound consequences 
for public health – like outbreaks of measles and individuals who refuse to adhere to 
public health recommendations like wearing masks during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Public health authorities know how to slow the spread of the coronavirus – they should 
require face masks in public spaces, minimize time indoor spaces with multiple people, 
move as many activities as possible to the outdoors, wash your hands frequently, and 
stay home. The government should encourage all of these steps and organize 
widespread testing and competent contact tracing. However, misinformation is vast and 
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can challenge different aspects of mitigation and control efforts. It is the role of 
government, civil society, and private companies to work together to counter harmful 
misinformation and disinformation. The WHOs EPI-WIN has outline a roadmap for how 
this might work in the US. Another prevalent online theory that prompted an official 
response from the Washington Health Department in May espoused that people who 
talk to contact tracers will be sent to nonexistent “FEMA camps.” Contact tracing is an 
old public health tool that attempts to interrupt the spread of disease by reaching out to 
people who test positive and those they have been in close contact with to provide 
needed support for them to isolate. As states and the federal government attempt to 
ramp up contract tracing workers, petitions online are circulating to galvanize action 
against contact tracing in a direct challenge to the goals of this newly minted workforce. 
A lack of a coordinated response and approach to the pandemic at all levels of 
government will only encourage the spread of misinformation targeted directly at 
response efforts. 
       As COVID-19 vaccine trials in August of 2020 approach the later phases of 
vaccine development and begin human trials, anti-vaccine sentiment in the US will 
make it challenging to reach herd immunity against the virus even once vaccines are 
available to the general public. The same anti-vaccine sentiment and misinformation 
that lead to measles outbreaks in the US will play a large factor if health officials do not 
communicate what is known about the vaccine and what its safety profile is. 
Additionally, it was recently reported that researchers in the first phase 3 trial for a 
COVID-19 vaccine in the US are struggling to recruit Blacks and Latinos – the same 
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groups of people disproportionately impacted by COVID-19. Without participation in 
vaccine trials, researchers cannot ensure the same efficacy in these vulnerable groups. 
       Finally, in the same way that the US invests in global health surveillance systems 
to encounter and fight outbreaks before they spread, the US government should invest 
in new tools and strategies to counter the rapidly evolving misinformation and 
disinformation environment online. Misinformation and disinformation about the SARS-
CoV-2 virus and COVID-19 are rampant online. Social media platforms with user 
generated content and little norms of accountability present significant challenges that 
include limited access to data in order for researchers to better understand the 
misinformation phenomena. At the individual level, sources of misinformation have 
varied credibility, trustworthiness, and expertise. Misinformation narratives and content 
are dominated by personal, negative and opinionated tones that often seek to sow 
discord and amplify both sides of a debate. Their persuasive impact is often informed by 
the values, beliefs, and identify of groups and their socio and cultural contexts. There is 
some evidence that misinformation with persuasive impact has the ability to change 
behavior, alter risk perception, and ultimately have an impact on health and the 
trajectory of the pandemic.  
Public health should rely on best risk communication practices that both alert and 
reassure people, communicate clear information in transparent ways that help people 
manage their fear and open up a dialogue so that risk communicators receive important 
information from the public, including questions, rumors, and misinformation. 
Communication strategies should be developed that give people options and allow them 
to practice risk harm reduction versus taking an abstinence only approach.  
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While disinformation is more difficult to ascertain, it is increasingly a threat to 
public health efforts. The 2016 presidential election revealed the proliferation and role of 
disinformation actors like bots and trolls and new technology will allow misinformation to 
spread more rapidly, even as governments and social media platforms implement 
changes today to combat it. “Deep fakes” are video forgeries that will become more 
prevalent as machine learning algorithms are developed and artificial intelligence bots 
are built to falsify images and video. Governments should invest in research and 
development using these same new technologies to combat the potential disruption and 
impact these new technologies may have on the next pandemic. The WHO’s EPI-WIN 
information platform provides governments with a model and a framework for countering 
the growing infodemic. As misinformation and disinformation present growing threats to 
the trajectory of the pandemic, the US government should adopt a similar framework in 
order to increase its credibility and trustworthiness among the US public and ultimately 










Abrams, E. M., & Greenhawt, M. (2020, April 15). Risk Communication During COVID-19. 
Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2213219820303639?via=ihub 
Adhikari, S. P., Meng, S., Wu, Y.-J., Mao, Y.-P., Ye, R.-X., Wang, Q.-Z., … Zhou, H. (2020, 
March 17). Epidemiology, Causes, Clinical Manifestation and Diagnosis, Prevention and Control 
of Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) During the Early Outbreak Period: A Scoping Review. 
Retrieved from https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32183901/?from_term=COVID-19 AND 
(misinformation or disinformation)&from_pos=2 
Aquino,F.,Donzelli, G.,DeFranco,E.,Privitera,G.,Lopalco, P.L.,Carducci, A.,2017.The web and 
public confidence in MMR vaccination in Italy. Vaccine 35 (35 Pt B), 4494–4498. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.07.029. 
Bessi, A., Zollo, F., Vicario, M., Scala, A., Caldarelli, G., &amp; Quattrociocchi, W. (2015, 
August 14). Trend of Narratives in the Age of Misinformation. Retrieved from 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0134641 
Bode, L., &amp; Vraga, E. K. (2017). See Something, Say Something: Correction of Global 
Health Misinformation on Social Media. Retrieved from 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10410236.2017.1331312?journalCode=hhth20 
Brainard, J., & Hunter, P. R. (2018, October 30). Misinformation making a disease outbreak 
worse: outcomes compared for influenza, monkeypox, and norovirus - Julii Brainard, Paul R 
Hunter, 2020. Retrieved from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0037549719885021 
Broniatowski, D. A., PhD, Jamison, A. M., MPH, Qi, S., SM, AlKulaib, L., SM, Chen, T., PhD, 
Benton, A., MS, . . . Dredze, M., PhD. (2018, September 12). Weaponized Health 
Communication: Twitter Bots and Russian Trolls Amplify the Vaccine Debate. Retrieved from 
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304567 
Bursztyn, L., Rao, A., Roth, C., &amp; Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2020, June 17). Misinformation 
During a Pandemic. Retrieved from https://bfi.uchicago.edu/working-paper/2020-44/ 
Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and 




Cuan-Baltazar, J. Y., MB, Munoz-Perez, M., MD, Robledo-Vega, C., MB, Perez-Zepeda, M., 
MB, & Soto-Vega, E., PhD. (n.d.). Misinformation of COVID-19 on the Internet: Infodemiology 
Study. Retrieved from https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32250960/ 
32 
 
Datta, S., O'Connor, P., Jankovic, D., Muscat, M., Mamou, M., Singh, S., . . . Butler, R. (2017, 
June 23). Progress and challenges in measles and rubella elimination in the WHO European 
Region. Retrieved from 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264410X17308290?via=ihub 
Earnshaw  VA, Bogart  LM, Klompas  M, Katz  IT.  Medical mistrust in the context of Ebola: 
Implications for intended care-seeking and quarantine policy support in the United States.   J 
Health Psychol. 2019;24(2):219-228. doi:10.1177/1359105316650507 
Pew. (2020). Aug. 9-Sept. 13, 2010 – Health. Retrieved from 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/dataset/september-2010-health/ 
Guidry JP, Carlyle K, Messner M, Jin Y. 2015. On pins and needles: how vaccines are 
portrayed on Pinterest. Vaccine 33(39):5051–56 
Harper, C. A., Satchell, L. P., Fido, D., & Latzman, R. D. (2020, April 27). Functional Fear 
Predicts Public Health Compliance in the COVID-19 Pandemic. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7185265/ 
Holroyd, T. A., Oloko, O. K., Salmon, D. A., Omer, S. B., & Limaye, R. J. (2020, February 17). 
Communicating Recommendations in Public Health Emergencies: The Role of Public Health 
Authorities. Retrieved from https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32078416/ 
Howard, J., Huang, A., Li, Z., Tufekci, Z., Zdimal, V., Westhuizen, H., . . . Rimoin, A. (2020, April 
13). Face Masks Against COVID-19: An Evidence Review. Retrieved August 06, 2020, from 
https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/202004.0203/v1 
Jorden, M. A., Rudman, S. L., Villarino, E., Hoferka, S., Patel, M. T., Bemis, K., & Simmons, C. 
R. (2020, June 4). Evidence for Limited Early Spread of COVID-19 Within the United States, 
January–February 2020. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6922e1.htm?s_cid=mm6922e1_w 
Kalichman  SC.  Denying AIDS: Conspiracy Theories, Pseudoscience, and Human Tragedy. 
Springer; 2009. 
Keselman A, Browne A C, Kaufman DR. 2008. Consumer health information seeking as 
hypothesis testing. J. Am. Med. Inform. Assoc.15(4):484–95 
Khatri, P., Singh, S., Belani, N., Yeong, Y., Lohan, R., Lim, Y., &amp; Teo, W. (2020, March 20). 
YouTube as source of information on 2019 novel coronavirus outbreak: A cross sectional study 
of English and Mandarin content. Retrieved from 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1477893920301046?via=ihub 
Kouzy, R., Jaoude, J. A., Kraitem, A., El Alam, M. B., Karam, B., &amp; Adib, E. (2020, March 
13). Coronavirus Goes Viral: Quantifying the COVID-19 Misinformation Epidemic on Twitter. 
Retrieved from https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32292669/ 
33 
 
Li, Y., Zhang, X., &amp; Wang, S. (2017, October 24). Fake vs. real health information in social 
media in China. Retrieved from 
https://asistdl.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/pra2.2017.14505401139 
Lasry, A., Kidder, D., Hast, M., Poovey, J., Sunshine, G., Winglee, K., … Ethier, K. A. (2020, 
April 16). Timing of Community Mitigation and Changes in Reported COVID-19 and Community 
Mobility ― Four U.S. Metropolitan Areas, February 26–April 1, 2020. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6915e2.htm?s_cid=mm6915e2_w 
Liu, M., AB, Caputi, T. L., MPH, &amp; Dredze, M., PhD. (2020, April 29). Internet Searches for 
Unproven COVID-19 Therapies in the United States. Retrieved July 13, 2020, from 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2765361 
Metzger, M.J., Flanagin, A.J., Eyal, K., Lemus, D.R., Mccann, R.M., 2003. Credibility for the 
21st century: integrating perspectives on source, message, and media credibility in the 
contemporary media environment. Ann. Int. Commun. Assoc. 27 (1), 293–335. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2003.11679029. 
McKee, M., &amp; Diethelm, P. (2010, December 14). How the growth of denialism undermines 
public health. Retrieved June 29, 2020, from https://www.bmj.com/content/341/bmj.c6950 
Olson, D. R., Huynh, M., Baumgartner, J., Castro, A., Chan, H. T., Daskalakis, D., … Kennedy, 
J. (2020, May 14). Preliminary Estimate of Excess Mortality During the COVID-19 Outbreak - 
New York City, March 11–May 2, 2020. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6919e5.htm?s_cid=mm6919e5_w 
Ozturk, P., Li, H., &amp; Sakamoto, Y. (2015, March 30). Combating Rumor Spread on Social 
Media: The Effectiveness of Refutation and Warning. Retrieved June 29, 2020, from 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7070103 
Porat, T., Garaizar, P., Ferrero, M., Jones, H., Ashworth, M., Vadillo, M.A., 2018. Content and 
source analysis of popular tweets following a recent case of diphtheria in Spain. Eur. J. Public 
Health. https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/cky144. 
Quinn, S. C. (2008, October 1). Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication in a Pandemic: A 
Model for Building Capacity and Resilience of Minority Communities. Retrieved from 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/18936256/ 
Ryu, S., & Chun, B. C. (n.d.). An Interim Review of the Epidemiological Characteristics of 2019 
Novel Coronavirus. Retrieved from https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32023775/ 
Sell, T. K., Hosangadi, D., & Trotochaud, M. (n.d.). Misinformation and the US Ebola 
Communication Crisis: Analyzing the Veracity and Content of Social Media Messages Related 




Seymour, B., Getman, R., Saraf, A., Zhang, L., &amp; Kalenderian, E. (2015, March). When 
advocacy obscures accuracy online: Digital pandemics of public health misinformation through 
an antifluoride case study. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4330844/ 
Swire-Thompson, B., &amp; Lazer, D. (2019, December 24). Public Health and Online 
Misinformation: Challenges and Recommendations. Retrieved from 
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-040119-094127 
Schuchat, A. (2020, May 7). Public Health Response to the Initiation and Spread of Pandemic 
COVID-19 in the United States, February 24–April 21, 2020. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6918e2.htm?s_cid=mm6918e2_w 
Sommariva, S., Vamos, C., Mantzarlis, A., Dao, L. U., &amp; Tyson, D. M. (2018, June 07). 
Spreading the (Fake) News: Exploring Health Messages on Social Media and the Implications 
for Health Professionals Using a Case Study. Retrieved from 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19325037.2018.1473178 
Taylor B, Miller E, Farrington C, Petropoulos MC, Favot-Mayaud I, et al. 1999. Autism and 
measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine: no epidemiological evidence for a causal association. 
Lancet 353(9169):2026–29 
Toppenberg-Pejcic, D., Noyes, J., Allen, T., Alexander, N., Vanderford, M., & Gamhewage, G. 
(n.d.). Emergency Risk Communication: Lessons Learned From a Rapid Review of Recent Gray 
Literature on Ebola, Zika, and Yellow Fever. Retrieved from 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29558199/ 
Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018, March 9). The spread of true and false news online. 
Retrieved from https://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1146/tab-pdf 
Wang, Y., McKee, M., Torbica, A., & Stuckler, D. (2019, September 18). Systematic Literature 
Review on the Spread of Health-related Misinformation on Social Media. Retrieved June 29, 









MPH Foundational Competencies 
Foundational Competency Description of how used for Capstone  
Evidence-based Approaches to Public Health   
1. Apply epidemiological methods to the breadth of settings and situations 
in public health practice 
 
2. Select quantitative and qualitative data collection methods appropriate 
for a given public health context 
 
3. Analyze quantitative and qualitative data using biostatistics, 
informatics, computer-based programming and software as appropriate 
 
4. Interpret results of data analysis for public health research, policy and 
practice 
 
Public Health & Health Care Systems  
5. Compare the organization, structure and function of health care, public 
health and regulatory systems across national and international settings 
Analyzed system and network level factors about 
misinformation online and made recommendations 
based on the specific gaps after a comprehensive 
review of the literature.   
6. Discuss the means by which structural bias, social inequities and 
racism undermine health and create challenges to achieving health equity 
at organizational, community and societal levels 
Described the historical context as the source of 
the persuasive impact on risk and health behavior 
that are not understood as overtly racist.  By 
identifying the etiology/history, the racist 
tendencies became increasingly clear.  
Planning & Management to Promote Health  
7. Assess population needs, assets and capacities that affect 
communities' health 
 
8. Apply awareness of cultural values and practices to the design or 
implementation of public health policies or programs  
Critically analyzed and reviewed the literature on 
the spread of misinformation and the impact of 
socio-cultural context to health behavior and 
perceived risk in order to recommend new policies 
and program.  
9. Design a population-based policy, program, project or intervention  
10. Explain basic principles and tools of budget and resource 
management 
 
11. Select methods to evaluate public health programs  
Policy in Public Health  
12. Discuss multiple dimensions of the policy-making process, including 
the roles of ethics and evidence 
 
13. Propose strategies to identify stakeholders and build coalitions and 




14. Advocate for political, social and economic policies and programs that 
will improve health in diverse populations 
 
15. Evaluate policies for their impact on public health and health equity  
Leadership  
16. Apply principles of leadership, governance and management, which 
include creating a vision, empowering others, fostering collaboration and 
guiding decision making 
 




18. Select communication strategies for different audiences and sectors Created a proposed visual framework for 
understanding how different components of 
misinformation spread can impact behavior and 
outcomes. 
19. Communicate audience-appropriate public health content, both in 
writing and through oral presentation 
Outlined, drafted and finalized Capstone paper 
including a literature review, recommendations and 
implications on a current public health problem. 
Created a slide deck based on the Capstone paper 
and delivered an oral presentation at Health 
Professions Day in front of an interprofessional 
audience.  
20. Describe the importance of cultural competence in communicating 
public health content 
Identified gaps in existing risk communication and 
infodemic countering strategies that highlight the 
need to understand the content and narratives 
present in misinformation in order to counter their 
persuasive impact among Blacks, Latinos, and 
other vulnerable populations. 
Interprofessional Practice*  
21. Perform effectively on interprofessional teams  
Systems Thinking  
22. Apply systems thinking tools to a public health issue  
Health Policy Leadership Concentration Competencies 
Competency Description of how Capstone used 
1. Apply economic concepts to understand the effect of changes in 
policies at the government, health systems, and public health sectors  
 
2. Synthesize economic concepts to assess equity and efficiency in 




3. Formulate efficient health policy change recommendations through 
the analysis of proposed health policy initiatives that could affect health 
outcomes of vulnerable populations  
Evaluated existing Risk and Crisis communication 
practices to determine gaps affecting the health of 
minority populations.  Recommended a set of new 
initiatives and actions that the US government 
should take to counter the threat of misinformation 
on vulnerable communities. 
4.  Develop recommendations to improve organizational strategies and 
capacity to implement health policy  
 
5. Analyze policy options to address environmental health needs at the 
local, state, and federal levels  
 
 
 
  
 
